The challenges for the opposition in Cuba, Russia and Venezuela

As we learn about Navalny's murder, I'm reposting this piece I wrote three years ago.

Opposing oppressive regimes has never been easy. It's not just about the differences with the regime in question, but also about the internal differences among those who are part of that political and social space. Opposition to an authoritarian regime is often only identified with antagonism towards a common political enemy. These internal differences are, in most cases, an obstacle to the political actions that give meaning to opposition activism. However, some opportunities can be leveraged in these spaces of contradiction, focusing on much broader purposes.

In recent weeks, we have seen, with surprise and not without some hope, how in Cuba and Russia, expressions of rejection of the regimes of Díaz-Canel and Putin are gaining significant enough strength to transcend the local scene. In Cuba, on the one hand, the bravery of the San Isidro Movement in raising its voice on behalf of a group of social and cultural actors, and on the other, the clumsiness of a regime that can only resort to abuse of power as its political response to the legitimate demand for freedom of its citizens, show the exhaustion of a societal model where power asymmetries suffocate all political and social groups.

In Russia, after the attempted poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, his return to the country after receiving medical attention in Germany poses a challenge to Putin on his turf. It's not that the Russian despot has limitations on using power to crush his enemy, but because he is doing so while support for Navalny is increasing, awakening a society with very few democratic references, but with an increasingly evident need to express its rejection, not only of a government that is not responding to its needs but also does not hide its sole mission to perpetuate itself in power.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, although society is besieged by Nicolás Maduro and the pandemic triggered by SARS-CoV-2, the Chavista political regime is taking measures to prevent any future capacity for the opposition. On the one hand, after the end of the last legislature, in accordance with the constitution, where the Opposition legitimately exercised political leadership, Maduro launched a sustained attack against civil society organizations with extensive experience in articulating responses to social problems, unlike the notable absence of the State. In recent months, we have seen how organizations in the areas of food, elderly assistance, and human rights have been victims of political persecution, harassment, and bullying by the Maduro regime.

The coincidence of several key circumstances means that the situation in Cuba and Russia offers new opportunities for struggle: in both cases, there is an exhaustion of the economic model, with crises exacerbated by the pandemic, where there is also a growing rejection of the political regime and abuses of power, around which mobilizations have occurred in defense of or in support of certain social and political actors. In both cases, fractures seem to be identified, as reported by Mauricio Mendoza Navarro and Alexey Kovalev, respectively. In the case of Venezuela, attacks on Roberto Patiño, Luis Francisco Cabezas, and Azul Positivo do not hide Maduro's real purpose of eliminating any possibility of associative capacity that could compete with the clientelistic instances of the State, potentially determining not only its capacity for social control but also, its political power proper.

The possibilities of success for these social and political mobilizations are uncertain. The Díaz-Canel regime will continue to intimidate and persecute, but the repressive apparatus also has a support system that has projection in political and cultural circles, here in the United States, Latin America, and Europe. This week, without sparing his cynicism, Silvio Rodríguez, an organic intellectual, stated that he "was not very clear about what happened in front of the Ministry of Culture." In Russia, avoiding mentioning Navalny and the protests, Putin attacked social networks, accusing technology companies of having political interests due to the use that leaders like Navalny give them in their political struggle. In Venezuela, the general population's restrictions are broad, ranging from basic needs to access to media due to lack of connectivity, as in Cuba. In Venezuela, we have seen how it has become customary for the few independent media outlets that continue to provide information to be subject to server attacks, equipment confiscation, or reporter detention, as in Cuba.

All that said, we reiterate that no political struggle is easy, but unlike Venezuela, where the Opposition needs to redirect its struggle in an openly authoritarian environment, in Cuba and Russia, the Opposition sectors have years of experience on this path, and what seems to be emerging is the need for a moment of gathering of interests. While in Cuba and Venezuela, economic shortages are seriously hitting the entire population, and the search for subsistence prevails over political struggle, it is also true that these difficulties internally affect the political regime, potentially causing fractures in its support, representing an opportunity where if there are sufficient conditions for mobilization, this can lead to other scenarios. In the Russian case, Navalny returns to Moscow knowing that he will be neutralized because he understands that he is more dangerous for Putin if he remains in the country. In all three cases, it seems clear that a just protest against abuses of power, a political figure determined to confront power, and a social organization capacity that challenges a political regime with no possibility of responding to social demands threaten these autocracies' stability.

Three political realities, united by the perverse effect of autocratization, with precarious, fragile, and disjointed oppositions, but aware of the historical challenge of facing consolidated political realities, where fear and intimidation are more efficient than an uncertain promise of freedom. That is the challenge, and it's not easy to anticipate the outcome.

January 2021